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Abstract
This paper shows how an attacker can break the confiden-
tiality of a hardware enclave with MEMBUSTER, an off-chip
attack based on snooping the memory bus. An attacker with
physical access can observe an unencrypted address bus and
extract fine-grained memory access patterns of the victim.
MEMBUSTER is qualitatively different from prior on-chip
attacks to enclaves and is more difficult to thwart.
We highlight several challenges for MEMBUSTER. First,
DRAM requests are only visible on the memory bus at last-
level cache misses. Second, the attack needs to incur minimal
interference or overhead to the victim to prevent the detection
of the attack. Lastly, the attacker needs to reverse-engineer the
translation between virtual, physical, and DRAM addresses
to perform a robust attack. We introduce three techniques,
critical page whitelisting, cache squeezing, and oracle-based
fuzzy matching algorithm to increase cache misses for mem-
ory accesses that are useful for the attack, with no detectable
interference to the victim, and to convert memory accesses
to sensitive data. We demonstrate MEMBUSTER on an Intel
SGX CPU to leak confidential data from two applications:
Hunspell and Memcached. We show that a single uninter-
rupted run of the victim can leak most of the sensitive data
with high accuracy.
1 Introduction
Hardware enclaves [1–5] provide secure execution environ-
ments to protect sensitive code and data. A hardware en-
clave has a small trusted computing base (TCB) including the
trusted hardware and program and assumes a strong threat
model where even a privileged attacker (e.g., hypervisor, OS)
cannot break the confidentiality and integrity of the execu-
tion. In such a threat model, the attacker cannot physically
attack the internals of the processor package, but can attempt
to tamper with or observe the externals of the processor (e.g.,
Cold-Boot attacks [6]). As a result, hardware enclaves are
attractive for protecting privacy-sensitive workloads such as
database [7], big data [8–10], blockchains [11–15], and ma-
chine learning [16, 17].
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Figure 1: On-chip side channels compared to MEMBUSTER.
The cache side-channel attack leaks addresses through a
shared cache, whereas the controlled-channel attack uses ad-
versarial memory management. MEMBUSTER leaks addresses
directly through the off-chip memory bus. The photo shows
an example hardware setup for the attack.
Along with the proliferation of hardware enclaves, many
side-channel attacks against them have been discovered [18–
23]. Side-channel attacks leak sensitive information from
enclaves via architectural or microarchitectural states. For
instance, controlled-channel attacks [24] use the OS privilege
to trigger page faults for memory access on different pages,
to reconstruct secrets from page-granularity access patterns
inside the victim program. We categorize these attacks as on-
chip side-channel attacks, where the attacker uses adversarial
or shared on-chip components to reveal memory addresses
accessed by the victim (Figure 1).
An attacker who can physically access the machine can
perform an off-chip side-channel attack that directly observes
the memory addresses on the memory bus. The memory bus,
which consists of a data bus and an address bus, delivers mem-
ory requests from a CPU to an off-chip DRAM. Although
the CPU encrypts the data of an enclave, all the addresses
still leave the CPU unencrypted, allowing the attacker to infer
program secrets from the access patterns. Since off-the-shelf
DRAM interfaces do not support address bus encryption, no
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existing hardware enclave can prevent physical attackers from
observing the memory address bus.
Several studies have hinted at the possibility of attacks
based on the memory address bus [25–27]. Costan et al. [26]
suggest the possibility of tapping the address bus, but ac-
knowledge that they are not aware of any successful example
of the attack. Maas et al. [25] suggest that an attacker who
can collect physical memory traces of a database server can
distinguish two different SQL queries operating on the same
dataset. However, to the best of our knowledge, no work has
shown how such a side channel can be exploited to break the
confidentiality of an enclave.
In this paper, we present MEMBUSTER, an off-chip side-
channel attack on the memory address bus. We show that
MEMBUSTER can be a substantial threat to hardware enclaves
because of its unique traits compared to the existing on-chip
attacks (§2.2). The need for off-chip access, despite being
a disadvantage, advantages the attacker as it makes MEM-
BUSTER much harder to mitigate with protected-access solu-
tions (Table 1). Recently, a wide range of tools [28–32] have
been developed for mitigating on-chip side-channel attacks
for enclaves with a reasonable overhead. These tools either
partition the resources (e.g., cache) to prevent an attacker from
learning information via shared resources or intercept actions
(e.g., page faults) to prevent an attacker from observing the
side channels. At their core, these solutions attempt to protect
the memory accesses from an attacker’s sight.
However, these protected-access solutions do not prevent
MEMBUSTER, which observes the memory addresses off-chip
and thus can bypass the protection of any on-chip solutions.
To prevent MEMBUSTER on the current hardware enclave
design, one must hide the accessed memory addresses, by
making the enclave execution oblivious to the secret data.
This requires either using oblivious algorithms [33] inside the
enclave or running the enclave atop an ORAM [34, 35]. Both
mechanisms bring significant performance overhead to the en-
clave. An alternative is to change the CPU and DRAM design
to encrypt the address bus, but implementing a decryption
module in DRAM can be expensive [36, 37].
We describe the challenges to perform a robust off-chip at-
tack as follows: (1) Address Translation. The attacker needs
to translate the DRAM requests into the physical addresses
by reverse-engineering the mapping and to further translate
them into virtual addresses of the victim enclave; (2) Lossy
Channel. The attacker only sees DRAM requests when cache
misses or write-back occurs. Since most modern CPUs have
a large last-level cache (LLC), a significant portion of mem-
ory accesses do not issue any DRAM requests. We show
why simple methods such as priming the cache does not incur
sufficient cache misses needed for the attack; (3) Unusual Be-
haviors in SGX. SGX has unique memory behaviors which
increase the difficulty of the attack. For example, we show that
common architectural features such as disabling the cache
do not work in SGX. We also find that paging in SGX hides
most of the memory accesses.
We first show how an attacker can translate the DRAM
requests, and can filter out irrelevant addresses to leave only
the critical addresses that are useful for the attack. Then, we
introduce two techniques, critical page whitelisting (§5.2) and
cache squeezing (§5.4.1), to increase useful cache misses by
thwarting page swaps and shrinking the effective cache for the
critical addresses. With more cache misses, the attacker can
observe more DRAM requests. These techniques do not cause
detectible interference to the victim, and can be combined
with cache priming to make more memory accesses visible
to the attacker. Our oracle-based fuzzy matching algorithm
(§6) can create an “oracle” of the secret-to-access-pattern
mapping, to identify the sensitive accesses from a sizable
memory bus trace. We then extract the sensitive data from
the noisy memory accesses by fuzzy-matching the accesses
against the oracle. We further show that hardware prefetching
can increase the efficiency of this algorithm in MEMBUSTER.
We demonstrate the attack by attaching Dual In-line Mem-
ory Module (DIMM) interposer to a production system with
an SGX-enabled Intel processor and a commodity DDR4
DRAM. We capture the memory bus signals to perform an
off-line analysis. We use two applications, Hunspell and Mem-
cached, to demonstrate the attack. Finally, we show the scala-
bility of our techniques by simulating the attack in modified
QEMU [38].
To summarize, the contributions of this paper are as fol-
lows:
• The setup of an off-chip side-channel attack on hard-
ware enclaves and identification of the challenges for
launching the attack robustly.
• Effective techniques for maximizing the side-channel
information with no detectible interference nor order-of-
magnitude performance overhead to the victim program.
• A fuzzy comparison algorithm for converting the address
trace collected on the memory bus to program secrets.
• Demonstration and experimentation of the attack on an
actual Intel SGX CPU. To our best knowledge, it is the
first work that shows the practicality of the attack.
The security implications of the off-chip side-channel at-
tacks can be pervasive because such a channel exists on almost
every secure processor with untrusted memory. We hope to
motivate further research by alarming the community about
the practicality and severity of such attacks.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we discuss the background, including hardware
enclaves, known on-chip side-channel attacks on SGX, and
the related defenses.
2.1 Intel SGX
We choose Intel SGX [39] as the primary attack target be-
cause Intel SGX has the most mature implementation and
the strongest threat model against untrusted DRAM. SGX is
Brasser et al. [20]
Schwarz et al. [21]
CacheZoom [22]
FLUSH-based [23]
Controlled [24]
MEMBUSTER
Software-Only 3 3 3 3 3 7
Protected-Access Fix [28–32] 3 3 3 3 3 7
Root Adversary 3 7 3 3 3 3
Noiseless 7 7 7 3 3 3
Lossless 7 7 7 3 3 7
Fine-Grained (64B vs. 4KB) 3 3 3 7 7 3
No Interference (e.g., AEX) 3 3 7 7 7 3
Low Overhead 3 3 7 7 7 3
Table 1: This work (MEMBUSTER) compared to previous side-
channel attacks on SGX. The two boldface rows illustrate
what we perceive to be the most important distinctions. The
colored cell indicates the attacker has the advantage.
a set of instructions for supporting hardware enclaves intro-
duced in the Intel 6th generation processors. SGX assumes
that only the processor package is trusted; all the off-chip
hardware devices, including the DRAM and peripheral de-
vices, are considered potentially vulnerable or compromised.
The threat model of SGX also includes physical attacks such
as Cold-Boot Attacks [6], which can observe sensitive data
from residuals inside DRAM.
An Intel CPU with SGX contains a memory encryption en-
gine (MEE), which encrypts and authenticates the data stored
in a dedicated physical memory range called the enclave page
cache (EPC). The MEE encrypts data blocks and generates
authentication tags when sending the data outside the CPU
package to be stored inside the DRAM. To prevent roll-back
attacks, the MEE also stores a version tree of the protected
data blocks, with the top level of the tree stored inside the
CPU. For Intel SGX, EPC is a limited resource; the largest
EPC size currently available on an existing Intel CPU is 93.5
MB, out of 128 MB Processor’s Reserved Memory (PRM).
The physical pages in EPC, or EPC pages, are mapped to
virtual pages in enclave linear address ranges (ELRANGEs)
by the untrusted OS. If all concurrent enclaves require more
virtual memory than the EPC size, the OS needs to swap the
encrypted EPC pages into regular pages.
However, even with MEE, Intel SGX does not encrypt the
addresses on the memory bus. As previously discussed, chang-
ing the CPU to encrypt the addresses requires implementing
the encryption logic on DRAM, and thus requires new tech-
nologies such as Hybrid Memory Cube (HMC) [36, 37].
The unencrypted address bus opens up a universal threat
to hardware enclaves with external encrypted memory. Ko-
modo [40], ARM CryptoIsland [41], Sanctum [5], and Key-
stone [4] do not encrypt data for an external memory by de-
fault. AMD SEV [42] allows hypervisor-level memory en-
cryption, but also does not encrypt addresses.
2.2 Comparison with Existing Attacks
In this section, we discuss how MEMBUSTER can be a sub-
stantial threat to hardware enclaves because of its unique traits.
We compare MEMBUSTER with various on-chip side-channel
attacks on SGX [20–24] in Table 1.
2.2.1 Side Channel Attacks on SGX
PRIME+PROBE. A shared cache hierarchy allows an adver-
sary to infer memory access patterns of the victim using
known techniques such as PRIME+PROBE [43, 44]. How-
ever, in PRIME+PROBE, the attacker usually cannot reliably
distinguish the victim’s accesses from noises of other pro-
cesses. The PRIME+PROBE channels are also lossy, as the
attacker may miss some of victim’s accesses while probing.
Brasser et al. [20] demonstrate PRIME+PROBE on Intel
SGX without interfering with the enclave, but the attack re-
quires running the victim program repeatedly to compensate
for its noise and signal loss. Schwarz et al. [21] show that
the attacker can alleviate the noise by identifying cache sets
that are critical to the attack. This technique can be applied to
applications that have data-dependent accesses in a small num-
ber of cache sets. CacheZoom [22] also uses PRIME+PROBE
but minimizes the noise by inducing Asynchronous Exits
(AEXs) every few memory accesses in the victim. This incurs
a significant overhead on enclaves, and also makes the attack
easily detectable [32].
Flush-based Side Channels. Other techniques such as
FLUSH+RELOAD [45] and FLUSH+FLUSH [46] use a shared
cache block between the attacker and the victim to create
a noiseless and lossless side channel. However, these tech-
niques cannot be directly applied to enclave memory, be-
cause an enclave does not share the memory with other pro-
cesses. However, these techniques can still be used to observe
the page table walk for enclave addresses [23]. Specifically,
the attacker can monitor the target page tables with a tight
FLUSH+RELOAD loop. As soon as the loop detects page
table activities, the attacker interrupts the victim and infers
page-granularity addresses. Similar to CacheZoom, this attack
incurs a significant AEX overhead and thus can be detected
by the victim.
Controlled Channels. Controlled-channel attacks [24] take
advantage of the adversarial memory management of the un-
trusted OS, to capture the access patterns of an SGX-protected
execution. Even though Intel SGX masks the lower 12 bits
of the page fault addresses to the untrusted OS, controlled-
channel attacks use sequences of virtual page numbers to
differentiate memory accesses within the same page. The con-
trolled channel is noiseless and lossless but can be detected
and mitigated as it incurs a page fault for each sequence of
accesses on the same page [28, 31].
2.2.2 Advantages of MEMBUSTER
As shown in Table 1, MEMBUSTER creates a noiseless side
channel by filtering out all of the non-victim memory accesses,
leaving only addresses that are useful for the attack. It can
observe memory accesses with cache line granularity. Also,
MEMBUSTER does not incur interference such as AEX or
page fault to the victim and needs not to incur an order-of-
magnitude overhead.
Several recent mechanisms, such as Varys [28], Hyper-
race [29], Cloak [30], T-SGX [31], or Déjà Vu [32], have
been proposed to prevent the attacker from observing mem-
ory access patterns in the victim. In general, PRIME+PROBE
can be mitigated by partitioning the cache to shield the vic-
tim from on-chip attackers. This does not defeat an off-chip
attacker who directly observes DRAM requests. T-SGX [31]
and Déjà Vu [32] have proposed to use the Intel Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) to prevent AEX or page
faults from an enclave. These techniques are based on thwart-
ing the interference (e.g., AEX, page faults) that causes the
side channels [22–24]. However, MEMBUSTER does not incur
such interference on enclaves, and thus cannot be thwarted
through similar approaches. To our best knowledge, there
is no reliable way to detect or mitigate MEMBUSTER using
existing on-chip measures.
2.2.3 Related Work
Other On-Chip Attacks. Other on-chip attacks worth men-
tioning are speculative-based execution side channels like
Foreshadow [18] or ZombieLoad [47], branch shadowing
side channels [48], denial-of-service attacks (e.g., Rowham-
mer [49, 50]), or rollback attacks [51, 52].
Other Off-Chip Side-Channel Attack. DRAM row
buffers can be exploited as side-channels between cores or
CPUs, as demonstrated in DRAMA [53]. DRAMA shows that
by observing the latency of reading or writing to DRAM, the
attacker can infer whether the victim has recently accessed the
data stored in the same row. DRAMA shows how a software-
only attacker can use DRAM row buffers as covert channels or
side channels. MEMBUSTER further explores how the attacker
can directly use the address bus as a side channel.
3 MEMBUSTER
In this section, we describe the basic attack model of MEM-
BUSTER. In further sections, we will refine and improve the
attack. At a high level, the attacker first sets up an environment
to collect the DRAM signals and waits until the victim exe-
cutes some code containing data-dependent memory accesses.
The attacker translates the collected signals into cache-line
granularity virtual addresses.
3.1 Threat Model
We assume the standard Intel SGX threat model in which noth-
ing but the CPU package and the victim program is trusted.
Everything else, including the OS or other applications, is
untrusted and can be controlled by the attacker. External hard-
ware devices are also untrusted, so the attacker can tap the
address bus to the external DRAM. For the advanced tech-
niques discussed in §5, the attacker may also use the root
privilege to install the modified SGX driver.
To tap the memory bus, the attacker needs to have physical
access to the machine where the victim is running. Such an as-
sumption eliminates the possibility of remote attacks through
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Figure 2: Hardware setup for a memory bus side-channel
attack. DIMM interposer collects the bus signals and sends
them to the signal analyzer. The attacker can use the analyzed
signals to learn the memory access pattern of the victim.
either cloud environments or network connections. The candi-
dates who may perform MEMBUSTER could be two types. On
the server-side, these may include the employees of a cloud
provider, or IT administrators of an institution, who act as
insiders to leak sensitive information. On the client-side, end
users may want to attack the local hardware enclaves, which
protect proprietary data (e.g., licenses, digital properties, etc).
We assume that the attacker has enough budget and knowl-
edge to acquire and install the DIMM interposer for the attack
described in §3.2. This might be an obstacle for the general
public, but we claim that the cost is manageable if the attacker
has a strong motivation for obtaining the data.
Like in the controlled channel and cache side channels,
MEMBUSTER assumes that the adversary has knowledge
of the victim application, by either consulting the source
code or reverse-engineering the application. The adversary is
also aware of the runtime used by the victim application for
platform support, such as the SDK libraries, library OSes,
or shield systems. In our experiments, we use Graphene-
SGX [54] for platform support of the victim applications.
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) in the library
OSes or the runtimes may complicate the extraction of secret
information but generally is insufficient to conceal the access
patterns completely [24]. ASLR offered by the host kernel is
irrelevant because a hostile host kernel can either control or
monitor the addresses where the victim enclaves are loaded.
3.2 Hardware Setup for the Attack
Figure 2 shows a detailed hardware setup for the MEM-
BUSTER attack. The hardware setup may vary on different
CPU models and vendors. The attacker installs an interposer
on the DIMM socket prior to system boot. The interposer
is a custom printed circuit board (PCB) that can be placed
between the DRAM and the socket. The interposer contains
a signal repeater chip which duplicates the command bus
signals and sends them to a signal analyzer. The analyzer
amplifies the signals and then outputs the signals to a storage
server through a PCIe interface.
In the rest of the section, we will highlight the key require-
ments in successfully performing the attack.
Sampling Rate. The sampling rate of the interposer needs to
be equal or higher than the clock rate of the DIMM in order
to capture all the memory requests. A standard DDR4 clock
rate ranges from 800 to 1600 MHz, while a DIMM typically
supports between 1066 (DDR4-2133) and 1333 (DDR4-2666)
MHz. To match with the sampling rate, the attacker can lower
the DIMM clock rate if it is configurable in the BIOS.
Recording Bandwidth. The sampling rate also determines
the recording bandwidth. For example, DDR4-2400 (1200
MHz) has a 32-bit address and a 64-bit data bus, thus the
recording bandwidth for the address bus is 1200 Mbps×32
bits = 4.47 GiB/s. For reference, the data bus of a DDR has
a 2× transfer rate, as well as a 2× transfer size. Hence, the
bandwidth for logging all the data on DDR4-2400 will be
17.88 GiB/s.
Acquisition Time Window. The acquisition time window
(i.e., the maximum duration for collecting the memory com-
mands) determines the maximum length of execution that the
attacker can observe. The acquisition time window equals
the acquisition depth (i.e., the analyzer’s maximum capacity
of processing a series of contiguous sample) divided by the
recording bandwidth of the interposer. For example, with 64
GiB acquisition depth, the analyzer can process and log the
commands from DDR4-2400 up to ∼ 14 seconds.
We surveyed several vendors which offer DIMM analyz-
ers [55–57] for purchase or rental. Among them, the maxi-
mum sampling rate can reach 1200-1600 MHz, and the ac-
quisition depth typically ranges between 4-60 GiB. One of
the devices [55] can extend the acquisition time window to
> 1 hour by attaching 16 TB SSD and streaming the com-
pressed log via PCIe at 4.8 GiB/s. Another device [57] does
not disclose the memory depth but specifies that it can cap-
ture up to 1G (109) samples. The cost of the analyzer varies
depending on the sampling rate and the acquisition depth. At
the time of writing, Kibra 480 [56] (1200 MHz, 4 GiB) costs
$6,500 per month, MA4100 [57] (1600 MHz, 1G-samples)
costs $8,000 per month, and JLA320A [55] (1600 MHz, 64
GiB) costs $170,000 for purchase.
3.3 Interpreting DRAM Commands
Once the attacker has finished setting up the environment, she
can collect the DRAM signals at any point in time, and ana-
lyze the trace off-line. As the first step, the attacker interprets
the DRAM commands collected from the interposer.
A modern DRAM contains multiple banks that are sepa-
rated into bank groups. Within each bank, data (often of the
same size as the cache lines) are located by rows and columns.
Each bank has a row buffer (i.e., a sense amplifier) for tem-
porarily holding the data of a specific row when the CPU
needs to read or write in the row. Because only one row can
be accessed in a bank at a time, the CPU needs to reload the
row buffer when accessing a data block in another row.
The log collected from the DRAM interposer typically
consists of the following commands:
• ACTIVATE(Rank,Bank,BankGroup,Row): Activating a
specific row in the row buffer for a certain rank, bank,
and bank group.
• PRECHARGE(Rank,Bank,BackGroup): Precharging and
deactivating the row buffer for a certain rank, bank, and
bank group.
• READ(Rank,Bank,BankGroup,Col): Reading a data
block at a specific column in the row buffer.
• WRITE(Rank,Bank,BankGroup,Col): Writing a data
block at a specific column in the row buffer.
Other commands such as PDX (Power Down Start), PDE
(Power Down End), and AUTO (Auto-recharge) are irrelevant
to the attack and thus omitted from the logs.
Based on the DRAM commands, we can construct the rank,
bank, row, and column of each trace, by simply tracing the
activated row within each bank. Note that the final traces are
also time-stamped by the clock counter of the analyzer. The
result of the translation is a sequence of logs containing the
timestamp, access type (read or write), rank, bank, row, and
column in the DRAM.
3.4 Reverse-engineering DRAM Addressing
A physical address in the CPU does not linearly map to a
DRAM address consisting of rank, bank, row, and column.
Instead, the memory controller translates the address to maxi-
mize DRAM bank utilization and minimize the latency. The
translation logic heavily depends on the CPU and DRAM
models, and Intel does not disclose any information. Thus,
the attacker needs to reverse-engineer the internal translation
rule for the specific set of hardware. This has been also done
by a previous study [53].
We use the traces collected from the DRAM interposer to
reverse-engineer the addressing algorithm of an Intel CPU.
For attacking the enclaves, we only need a part of the ad-
dressing algorithm that affects the range of the enclave page
cache (EPC). We write a program running inside an enclave,
which probes the DRAM addresses translated from the EPC
addresses. The probing program allocates a heap space larger
than the EPC size (93.5MB). For every cache line in the range,
the program generates cache misses by repeatedly flushing
the cache line and fetching it into the cache. By accessing
each cache line multiple times, we can differentiate the traces
caused by probing from other memory accesses in the back-
ground and minimize the effect of re-ordering by the CPU’s
memory controller. The techniques in §3.5 are also needed for
translating the probed virtual addresses to physical addresses.
Using the DRAM traces generated by probing cache lines
inside the EPC, we can create a direct mapping between the
physical addresses and DRAM addresses (ranks, banks, bank
groups, rows, and columns). We further deduce the addressing
function of the target CPU (i5-8400), by observing the chang-
ing bits in the physical addresses when DRAM addresses
change. We conclude that the addressing function on i5-8400
is as shown in Figure 3. Other CPU models may implement a
different addressing function, and reverse-engineering should
BG[0]
BG[1]
BA[1]
ROW[15:0] COL[9:3]
15 14 13 7 616171819
BA[0]
32 … …PA
Figure 3: The reverse engineered addressing function of the
i5-8400 CPU. The function translate a physical address (PA)
to the Bank Group (BG), Bank Address (BA), Row (ROW) and
Column (COL) within the DRAM.
be done for each CPU model beforehand.
3.5 Translating PA to VA
In order to extract the actual memory access pattern of
the victim, we need to further translate the physical ad-
dresses into more meaningful virtual addresses. In general, a
root-privileged attacker has multiple ways of obtaining the
physical-to-virtual mappings: either by parsing the proc file
/proc/[PID]/pagemap (assuming Linux as the OS), or using
a modified driver. However, paging in an enclave is controlled
by the SGX driver, and the vanilla driver forbids poking the
physical-to-virtual mappings through the proc file system.
Nevertheless, the attack can still modify the SGX driver to
retrieve the mappings, and this is what we do.
Hence, we print the virtual-to-physical mappings in the
dmesg log and ship the log together with the memory traces.
During our offline analysis, we use the dmesg log as an input
to the attack script. The dmesg log also contains system tim-
ings of paging, and can be further calibrated to the timestamps
of the collected traces. Because paging in an enclave needs
to copy the whole pages in and out of the EPC a sequential
access pattern of a whole or partial page will appear in the
memory traces. After calibration, we successfully translate
all the physical addresses to virtual addresses.
4 Attack Examples
We show how MEMBUSTER exploits two example applica-
tions: (1) spell checking of a confidential document using
Hunspell, and (2) email indexing cache using Memcached.
4.1 Hunspell
Hunspell is an open-source spell checker library widely
used by LibreOffice, Chrome, Firefox and so on [58]. The
controlled-channel attack [24] has shown that Hunspell is
exploitable by page-granularity access patterns, which moti-
vated us to use it as the first target of MEMBUSTER. We make
the same assumptions as described in [24]; the attacker tries
to infer the contents of a confidential document owned by a
victim while Hunspell is spell-checking. The attacker knows
the language of the document, and therefore can also obtain
the same dictionary, which is publicly available.
The side-channel attacks on Hunspell are based on observ-
ing the access patterns for searching words in a hash table
1 // add a word to the hash table
2 int HashMgr::add_word(const std::string& word) {
3 struct hentry* hp = (void*) malloc(sizeof(struct
hentry) + word->size());
4 struct hentry* dp = tableptr[i]; // Populate hp
5 while (dp->next != NULL) {
6 if (strcmp(hp->word, dp->word) == 0) {
7 free(hp); return 0;
8 }
9 dp = dp->next;
10 }
11 dp->next = hp;
12 return 0;
13 }
14 // lookup a word in the hash table
15 struct hentry* HashMgr::lookup(const char* word) {
16 struct hentry* dp;
17 if (tableptr) {
18 dp = tableptr[hash(word)];
19 for (; dp != NULL; dp = dp->next) {
20 if (strcmp(word, dp->word) == 0) return dp;
21 }
22 }
23 return NULL;
24 }
Figure 4: The Hunspell code which leaks access patterns with
controlled-channel attacks and MEMBUSTER.
tableptr[0]
tableptr[1]
bookkeeping6a60f0 congestion6f68f0 ...
cask6c8cc0
1. Unmasked addresses:
tableptr[0-511]
tableptr[0-511]
bookkeeping6a6000 congestion6f6000 ...
cask6c8000
2. Page fault addresses (controlled-channel attacks):
tableptr[0-7]
tableptr[0-7]
bookkeeping6a60c0 congestion6f68c0 ...
cask6c8cc0
3. Cache miss addresses (MEMBUSTER):
Figure 5: Observerable address patterns in Hunspell by dif-
ferent attacks. Controlled-channel attacks only see page-fault
addresses without the lower 12 bits, whereas MEMBUSTER
can see LLC-miss addresses without the lower 6 bits.
created from the dictionary. A simplified version of the vulner-
able code is shown in Figure 4. The Hunspell execution starts
with reading the dictionary file and inserting the words into
the hash table by calling HashMap::add_word(). For each
word from the dictionary, HashMap::add_word() allocates
a hentry node and inserts it to the end of the linked list in the
corresponding hash bucket. Then, Hunspell reads the words
for spell-checking and calls HashMap::lookup() to search
the words in the hash table. Both HashMap::add_word() and
HashMap::lookup() leak the hash bucket of the word cur-
rently being inserted or searched, and all the hentry nodes
before the word is found in the linked list.
The controlled-channel attack leaks different access pat-
terns from those that we observe on our memory bus attack,
as the example shown in Figure 5. Controlled-channel attacks
leak access patterns through page fault addresses, which are
masked by SGX in the lower 12 bits. However, for applica-
tions like Hunspell, controlled-channel attacks can use se-
quences of page fault addresses to infer more fine-grained ac-
cess patterns within a page. For example, although the nodes
for bookkeeping and booklet are on the same page, the
controlled-channel attacks can differentiate the accesses by
the page addresses accessed before reading the nodes.
On the other hand, our memory bus channel can leak the
addresses of each cache line being read from and written
back to DRAMs, making the attacks more fine-grained than
controlled-channel attacks. The attacks can differentiate the
access patterns based on the addresses of each node accessed
during lookups, instead of inferring through the address se-
quences. The granularity of memory bus attacks makes it
possible to extract sensitive information even if the access
patterns are partially lost due to caching.
4.2 Memcached
Memcached [59] is an in-memory key-value database, which
is generally used to speed up various server applications by
caching the database. Memcached is used in various services
such as Facebook [60] and YouTube [61]. In this example, we
assume that Memcached runs in an SGX enclave, as part of a
larger secure system (e.g., secure mail server).
We consider the scenario discussed by Zhang et al. [62],
where a mail server indexes the keywords in each of the emails
and the attacker can inject an arbitrary email to the victim’s
inbox by simply sending an email to the victim. As shown
in Figure 6, we assume that the index data is stored in Mem-
cached running in an SGX enclave. Since the attacker owns
the machine, she can also perform MEMBUSTER by observ-
ing the memory bus. The attacker’s goal is to use his abilities
to reveal the victim’s secret emails A, B, and C.
Memcached does not have any data-dependent control flow,
but the attacker can use the memory bus side channel to infer
the query sent to Memcached. Memcached stores all keys in
a single hash table primary_hashtable defined in assoc.c
using the Murmur3 hash of a key as an index. Each entry of
the hash table is linearly indexed by the Murmur3 hash of
the key. Thus Memcached will access an address within the
hash table whenever it searches for a key. By observing the
address, the attacker can infer the hash of the key.
Memcached dynamically allocates the hash table at the
beginning of the application. The attacker can easily find out
the address of the hash table by sending a malicious email
to make Memcached access the hash table. For example in
Figure 6, the attacker sends an email D which contains a word
"Investment". Memcached accesses the entry, and the attacker
observes the address. Since the attacker already knows the
hash value of the key, she can easily find out the address of
the hash table.
Next, the attacker keeps observing the memory accesses
within the hash table. Once the attacker figures out the hash
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Figure 6: An example attack scenario where a mail server
uses Memcached as an index database. A, B, C and D are the
emails.
table address, she can reveal the hash values of the query, by
observing the virtual addresses accessed by Memcached. To
match the hash values with words, the attacker pre-computes
some natural words and creates a hash-to-word mapping.
Even though hashes can conflict, we show that the attacker
can recover most of the words by just picking a most-common
word based on the statistics.
5 Increasing Critical Cache Misses
As previously discussed, the basic attack model of MEM-
BUSTER can observe memory transactions with cache-line
granularity when the memory transactions cause cache misses
in the last-level cache (LLC). Such an attack model is weak-
ened in a modern processor with a large LLC ranging from
4 MB to 64 MB, causing only a small fraction of memory
transactions to be observable on the DRAM bus.
In this section, we introduce techniques to increase cache
misses of the target enclaves. In a realistic scenario, an at-
tacker only cares about increasing the cache misses within
the virtual address range which leaks the side-channel infor-
mation. Take the attack on Hunspell for example, the attacker
only needs to observe the access on the nodes which store
the dictionary words. We called a memory address as critical
if the address is useful for the attack. Our goal is to increase
the cache misses on critical addresses, to improve the success
rate of the MEMBUSTER attack.
5.1 Can We Disable Caching?
A simple solution to increase cache misses is to disable
caching in the processor. On x86, entire cacheability can
be disabled by enabling the CD bit and disabling the NW bit
in the control register CR0 ( [63], Section 11.5.3). Some archi-
tectures allow disabling caching for a specific address range,
primarily for serving uncacheable DMA requests or memory-
mapped I/Os. For instance, on x86, users can use the Memory
Type Range Register (MTRR) to change the cacheability of a
physical memory range. Newer Intel processors also support
page attribute table (PAT) to manage page cacheability with
the attribute field in page table entries.
However, besides disabling the entire cacheability, nei-
ther MTRR or PAT can overwrite the cacheability of SGX’s
processor-reserved memory (PRM) [39]. The cacheabil-
ity of PRM is specifically controlled by a special reg-
ister called Processor-Reserved Memory Range Register
(PRMRR), which can be only written by BIOS during boot-
ing. Since there is no proprietary BIOS that allows the user
to modify PRMRR, the attacker effectively has no way to
change the cacheability of the encrypted memory. However,
since the BIOS is untrusted in the threat model of SGX, in
theory, one can reverse-engineer the existing BIOS or build a
custom BIOS to overwrite PRMRR. We do not choose this
route because disabling cacheability will incur significant
slowdown, making the attack easy to detect by the victim.
5.2 Critical Page Whitelisting
We observed that after paging (swapping), memory access
in the swapped pages becomes unobservable to the attacker.
Such a phenomenon is common for SGX since SGX has to
rely on the OS to swap pages in and out of the EPC. Both
swap-in and swap-out causes the page to be loaded into the
cache hierarchy (LLC, L2, and L1-D caches), because the
SGX instructions for swap-in and swap-out, i.e., eldu and
ewb, require re-encrypting the page from/to a regular physical
page [39]. After the instructions, the cache lines stay in the
cache hierarchy until being evicted by other memory access.
Currently, an Intel CPU with SGX only has up to 93.5MB in
the EPC, making paging the primary obstacle to observing
critical transactions on the memory bus.
On the other hand, paging also complicates the virtual-
to-physical address translation, as the mappings can change
midst execution. We observe certain patterns in the memory
bus log to identify the paging events. However, these patterns
can also become unobservable if the page is recently swapped
and most of the cache lines are still in the LLC.
Therefore, to eliminate the side effect of paging, we pin
the EPC pages for the critical address range, by modifying
the SGX driver. We start by identifying the critical address
range of each target program. Take the Hunspell program
for example. The critical memory transactions come from
accessing the dictionary nodes, which are allocated through
malloc(). For simplicity, we disable Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) inside the enclave (controlled by the
library OS [54]), although we confirmed that ASLR can be de-
feated by identifying contiguous memory access pattern in the
traces. Next, we calculate the number of EPC pages needed
for pinning the critical pages. For a Hunspell execution using
an en_US dictionary, the total malloc() range is 5,604 KB.
Finally, we need to give the critical address range as an input
to the modified SGX driver. When the driver allocates an EPC
page, it checks if the virtual address is in the critical address
range and use an in-kernel flag to indicate if the page has to
be pinned. The driver will never swap out a pinned page.
5.3 Priming the Cache
We explore ways to actively contaminate the caches by ac-
cessing contentious addresses. This technique is called cache
priming, which is used in the PRIME+PROBE attack [44]. Pre-
vious work has established priming techniques for either same-
core or cross-core scenarios. Some priming techniques are
restricted by CPU models, especially since many recent CPU
models have employed designs or features that raise the bar
for cache-based side-channel attacks. However, recent studies
also show that, even with these defenses, attackers continue to
find attack surfaces within the CPU micro-architectures, such
as priming the cache directory in a non-inclusive cache [64].
We focus on cross-core priming since same-core priming
requires interrupting the enclaves using AEX or page faults.
The usage of cache priming in MEMBUSTER is distinctly dif-
ferent from existing cache-based side-channel attacks since
MEMBUSTER does not require resetting the state of the cache
or synchronizing with the victim. The goal of cache prim-
ing in MEMBUSTER is to simply evict the critical addresses
from the cache to increase the cache misses. Also, with cache
squeezing, we only have to prime the cache sets dedicated to
the critical addresses. These differences make it easy to apply
multiple priming attacks simultaneously, as long as they all
eventually contribute to increasing cache misses.
Cross-Core Cache Priming We run multiple priming pro-
cesses on other cores to evict the critical cache lines from the
LLC. These processes will repeatedly access the cache sets
that are shared with the critical addresses of the victim. The
attacker will start by identifying the critical addresses and the
cache sets to prime. Then, the attacker starts the priming pro-
cesses before the victim enclave, to actively evict the cache
lines during execution. Take the Hunspell attack for example.
Since its critical addresses are spread over all cache sets, the
attacker needs to repeatedly prime all cache sets. No syn-
chronization is required between the attack processes and the
victim. We do not prime the L1 and L2 caches across cores,
but cross-core priming on private caches is demonstrated on
Intel CPUs [64].
A potential hurdle for cross-core priming is to obtain suf-
ficient memory bandwidth to evict the critical cache lines.
Based on our experiments, a priming process that sequentially
accesses the LLC has around 100–200MB/s memory band-
width. Priming a 9MB LLC with 2,048 sets requires about 100
milliseconds, which is too slow to evict the critical cache lines
before the lines are accessed by the victim again. For instance,
Hunspell accesses a word every 2 thousand DRAM cycles
(< 1 microseconds), and Memcached accesses a word every 5
million DRAM cycles (< 2.5 milliseconds). We will discuss,
however, how an attacker can evict all the critical cache lines
within a few milliseconds by pinpointing the priming process
to target only 64–128 sets (See §5.4.2).
Page-Fault Cache Priming Potentially, an attacker can
prime the LLC, L2, and L2-D caches on the same core with
the victim, by interrupting the victim periodically. To do so,
the attacker can take a similar approach to the Controlled-
Channel Attack: The attacker identifies two code pages con-
taining code around the critical memory accesses, and then
alternatively protects the pages to trigger page faults. To in-
crease cache misses, the attacker needs not to prime the cache
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Figure 7: Techniques used to increase the cache miss rate
with minimal performance overhead.
at every page fault, but rather can prime at a low frequency.
However, such a page-fault priming technique still causes a
lot of interference and overhead to the victim, making it easy
to detect [22] or to mitigate [31,32]. For example, priming the
cache on every 10-20 page faults incurs about 3× overhead
to the victim. In addition, known countermeasures, such as
T-SGX [31], can effectively prevent page faults using transac-
tional instructions. Therefore, we do not use this technique.
5.4 Shrinking the Effective Cache Size
As previously discussed, cache priming alone cannot create
sufficient memory access bandwidth for evicting the critical
cache lines in time. Therefore, we introduce a novel tech-
nique called cache squeezing, which shrinks the effective
cache size to incur more cache misses for a specific address
range. We show that the technique can be combined with non-
intrusive techniques like cross-core cache priming to make
MEMBUSTER a more powerful side channel.
5.4.1 Cache Squeezing
As the name suggests, cache squeezing can shrink the effec-
tive cache size for a given set of critical pages. By squeezing
the cache that an enclave can use, the attacker can incur both
conflict misses and capacity misses on LLC, therefore becom-
ing able to observe more cache misses on the bus.
In modern processors, the L2 cache and LLC are physically-
indexed. The lowest 6 bits of the physical address are omitted,
given that each cache line is 64 bytes. The next s lower bits
are taken as the set index. Each set then consists of W ways
to store multiple cache lines of the same set index. For an
enclave, an OS-level attacker can control the physical pages
that are mapped to the enclave’s virtual pages. This allows
the attacker to manipulate the physical frame number (PFN)
of each virtual address of the enclave, and subsequently, the
higher s− (12−6) = s−6 bits of the set index.
Figure 7(1) shows how cache squeezing works in combina-
tion with page pinning. The attacker first defines the critical
addresses of the victim, then maps these pages to EPC pages
that share the minimum amount of cache sets. This tech-
nique requires cache pinning so that these pages will never
be swapped out from the EPC. Since the OS only controls
the higher s−6 bits of the set indices, the smallest group of
physical pages that will evict each other share exactly 26 = 64
sets. We called such a group of physical pages a conflict group.
Since the maximum size of EPC is 93.5 MB, the entire cache
can be partitioned to 2s−6 conflict groups where each conflict
group can accommodate 93.5 MB/4 KB/2s−6 EPC pages. In
our experiment, s = 11 (2048 sets) and W = 12, so each con-
flict group can accommodate at most 748 pages (2,992 KB).
The critical address range of Hunspell, for example, is the
whole malloc() space, which is 5,604 KB and thus requires
two conflict groups. Finally, the attacker gives the critical
address range to a modified SGX driver, which will only map
physical pages from the selected conflict groups to any critical
virtual address.
Using cache squeezing to increase cache misses has many
benefits. First of all, it does not require interrupting the victim
enclaves, nor does it need to incur more memory accesses
in the background. All memory accesses used to push cache
lines out of the L2 cache and LLC are legitimate accesses
from the victim enclaves. Therefore, cache partitioning can-
not defeat cache squeezing because there is no cross-context
cache sharing. In fact, way-partitioning features such as Intel
CAT [65] can be exploited to further shrink the effective cache
sizes in combination with cache squeezing.
5.4.2 Cross-Core Priming with Cache Squeezing
As we mentioned in § 5.3, cross-core cache priming may not
have sufficient bandwidth to evict the critical cache lines in
time. However, we found that cache squeezing makes the
priming more effective by shrinking the effective cache size.
Instead of priming all the cache sets, the attacker now only
has to prime the sets of the targeted conflict groups containing
the critical addresses (Figure 7(2)). Each group of 64 cache
sets contains W ×4KB, allowing the priming process to evict
the part of cache within a millisecond. The priming process
can run in parallel and does not affect the victim execution
except causing cache contention.
5.4.3 Limitation
Although cache squeezing can increase the cache misses
among critical addresses, it could be less effective if the victim
has only a few critical addresses or a small memory footprint.
If the critical addresses can only fill a small part of a conflict
group (W × 4 KB), the victim enclave may not be able to
cause enough cache misses to benefit the attacker. For exam-
ple, Memcached only has 2 MB (500 pages) of the critical
address range. To fill all of the 748 pages, we identify the
top 248 frequently-accessed pages (in addition to the critical
addresses) through simulation, and assign these extra pages
to the same conflict group.
Note that the LLC of a modern CPU usually has a cache
slice feature that distributes the addresses across multiple
cache banks using an undocumented, model-specific map-
ping function. Reverse-engineering the slicing function of the
target CPU is useful for further reducing the effective cache
space for an enclave if the enclave has a smaller memory
footprint. Reverse-engineering of slicing functions is already
explored by prior papers [64], so we will not discuss this
technique in this paper.
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Figure 8: Implementation of critical page whitelisting and
cache squeezing in a modified SGX driver. To ensure no
swapping in the sensitive memory range, EPC pages are set
aside in a separate queue. The attackers can further select the
EPC pages based on set indexes or other logistics.
One can detect the cache squeezing by testing if critical
addresses are mapped in an adversarial way. Since the en-
clave is not aware of physical address mappings by itself, it
needs to experimentally detect such mapping by accessing
the addresses and measure latency. However, we claim that it
is challenging because (1) the victim needs to know the criti-
cal address range to detect the mapping, and (2) the enclave
cannot tell if the mapping was accidental or intentional.
5.4.4 Implementation
We use a modified SGX driver to implement both critical
page whitelisting and cache squeezing as shown in Figure 8.
The driver accepts parameters to specify a sensitive range
within the victim application, and calculates how many con-
flict groups are required for the attack. 1© When the driver
initializes, it inserts conflicting EPC pages to a separate queue
(i.e., conflict_list). 2© When adding enclave pages, the
driver checks if the virtual page number is in the critical ad-
dress range. 3© The driver maps the critical pages to pages
popped from conflict_list. 4© All of the mapped pages
are added to the list of loaded pages (load_list). 5© When
the driver needs to evict an EPC page, it searches the victim
from the list of loaded pages. 6© If the selected page is a
critical page, it searches again. 7© Only non-critical pages are
evicted and the enclave continues to run. Other enclaves are
not affected by the modification and can function normal with
marginal overheads.
Our change to the SGX driver contains only 290 lines. The
SGX driver uses the fault operation in vm_operations_struct
to handle EPC paging. We use a customized fault function,
which checks the faulting virtual addresses of the enclave
and then applies different paging strategies to critical and
non-critical addresses. We hard-code the range of critical
addresses for each application and thus require switching the
drivers for a different target. Potentially, the driver can export
an API to the attackers for specifying the critical addresses.
Our driver also only supports one single victim enclave at a
time. However, we can extend the driver to target multiple
enclaves simultaneously as long as the total memory usage
can fit into the EPC (required for pinning).
6 Extracting Sensitive Access Patterns
OS techniques including critical page whitelisting, cache
squeezing, and cross-core priming effectively increase the
cache misses on the cache misses on critical addresses. How-
ever, the traces collected from the memory bus are still full of
noise and contain no marker for splitting the critical memory
accesses into iterations. Unlike controlled-channel attacks,
MEMBUSTER cannot rely on repeated code addresses (e.g.,
from a loop) to mark and then split the critical accesses be-
cause these code addresses tend to be accessed too frequently
to be evicted by our techniques. Therefore, the attacker needs
to deeply analyze the memory traces offline to distill the sen-
sitive information.
To extract the sensitive access patterns, we identify four
techniques for filtering the critical memory addresses and
matching with a known oracle for the target application: (1)
offline simulation; (2) searching the beginning of sensitive
accesses; (3) fuzzy pattern matching, and (4) exploiting cache
prefetching. We use the two examples to explain how to
analyze memory bus traces.
6.1 Offline Simulation
Side-channel attacks often require attackers to have some
knowledge about the behaviors of the victim. For example, the
controlled-channel attack on Hunspell requires the attacker to
extract the virtual page addresses of the linked list nodes of
each dictionary word, during an online training phase while
attacking the victim. However, MEMBUSTER cannot perform
online training with the victim as the analysis of the memory
traces is performed offline. Instead, the attacker needs to gen-
erate an oracle of the victim behavior, using offline simulation
of the target application.
We observe that, for each application, we can use a deter-
ministic oracle, given that users have adopted some publicly
available data (e.g., the en_US dictionary). For example, dur-
ing the simulation, we run a modified Hunspell in an enclave,
which prints out the indexes and the addresses of linked list
nodes visited for each word. Then, we reuse the output as
an oracle, to be used in analyzing any traces based on the
same en_US dictionary. We assume that there are only a finite
amount of English dictionaries in the world.
As discussed earlier, ASLR in the enclaves does not in-
validate an oracle, since ASLR can be easily defeated by
observing the specific patterns related to binary loading. The
addresses in the oracle can simply be shifted by a certain
offset to be usable again.
6.2 Searching Sensitive Accesses
Finding the first sensitive access is critical for deciding where
to start matching access patterns. Note that not all accesses to
the critical addresses are sensitive. For Hunspell, allocating
nodes for each word emits a long sequence of monotonically
increasing virtual addresses that can be used to identify the
sensitive addresses. We match the virtual addresses to the
oracle, to find the longest increasing subsequence (LIS) of
addresses as accessed in the dictionary order. After finding the
LIS, the next critical access is the beginning of the sensitive
addresses.
6.3 Fuzzy Pattern Matching
In MEMBUSTER, we observe that a part of memory addresses
in a sensitive access pattern is likely to be missing due to
caching. Even with cache squeezing and cross-core priming,
it is almost impossible to force page misses on every critical
memory access. Therefore, to analyze lossy traces, we use
fuzzy pattern matching to flexibly match the traces with only
parts of access patterns. As long as at least one or a few
accesses of a pattern cause LLC misses, we can identify the
pattern as a possible result for recovery.
In fuzzy pattern matching, one address may be parsed as
different access patterns of the victim for two reasons. First,
within a data structure such as a linked list or a tree, the same
address (an inner node) may be accessed while traversing
or searching other nodes. Second, a cache line may contain
multiple nodes and thus can be accessed when visiting one
of the nodes. For either of the reasons, a single memory trace
may be accounted for multiple possible access patterns in the
oracle.
We use a simple strategy to select the best interpretation for
a set of memory traces. We assign a score to each possibility
based on how complete the traces have matched with an access
pattern in the oracle. For the addresses of a tree or a linked list,
we assign lower scores to the root and the first few nodes and
assign higher scores to nodes that are closer to leaves or the
end of the list. By collecting the top-ranking interpretations of
the memory traces, an attacker can generate a list of the most
probable options of the target secret. Potentially, a grammar
checker or any semantic-based heuristic can help to validate or
to rank the recovery results. We leave the exercise of applying
more context-aware heuristics for future work.
6.4 Exploiting Cache Prefetching
Finally, we observe that the cache prefetching features of
CPUs can help increase the accuracy of the attack. For ex-
ample, a recent Intel CPU includes Next-line Prefetcher and
128-byte Spatial Prefetcher. The Next-line Prefetcher, belong-
ing to the L2 cache, will preload the cache line next to the
one that is currently accessed. The 128-bit Spatial Prefetcher,
which also belongs to the L2 cache, prefetches the pairing
cache line that completes the accessed cache line to a 128-
byte aligned chunk into the LLC. Both prefetchers increase
the number of memory accesses relevant to the secret data.
Therefore, we expand the range of pattern matching based
on our knowledge of cache prefetching, including extending
the addresses representing each secret by 64 bytes, both back-
ward and forward. As a result, even if the CPU has cached a
line, the prefetched lines may still cause cache misses and be
observed on the memory bus.
CPU
Model Intel i5-8400 (Coffee lake)
LLC Size 9 MB
LLC # Slice 6 Slices
LLC # Associativity 12-way set associative
LLC # Sets 2048
Memory
DIMM Type DDR4-2400 UDIMM (Non-ECC)
Capacity 8 GB
Channel/Rank/Bank/Row 1/1/16/65536
Page Size 8 KB (1 KB/package)
Max Bus Frequency 1200 MHz
Table 2: Hardware specification for the experiment
Other cache prefetchers such as Stream Prefetcher can
monitor an ascending or descending sequence of addresses
from the L1 or L2 cache and can prefetch up to 20 cache lines
ahead of the loaded address. Such a prefetcher generally will
not improve the accuracy of the pattern matching. However,
these prefetchers can cause space pressure to caches, making
cache squeezing more effective.
7 Evaluation
In this section we present the evaluation results of the MEM-
BUSTER attack, based on the two vulnerable applications
described in §4. The evaluation mainly answers the following
questions regarding the MEMBUSTER attacks:
• How accurate can MEMBUSTER extract the secrets from
applications that are vulnerable to such an attack?
• How do the attack techniques of MEMBUSTER impact
the attack accuracy?
• How much slowdown (or interference) the various tech-
niques will incur on the applications?
• What is the limitation of MEMBUSTER?
• How sensitive are the attack results of MEMBUSTER to
the last-level cache (LLC) size of the target CPU?
We evaluate the MEMBUSTER attack in various settings:
(1) the basic attack without any techniques (None); (2) the op-
timized attack with cache squeezing (SQ); (3) the optimized
attack with cache squeezing combined with cross-core cache
priming (SQ+PR).
7.1 Experiment Setup
In this section, we describe the experimental setup of the
MEMBUSTER attack. We use both physical and simulated
experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of MEMBUSTER.
7.1.1 Physical Experiment
Hardware Setup. The hardware setup we used for the exper-
iment is shown in Table 2. We use a machine equipped with
an Intel SGX CPU. In the machine, we connect the DIMM to
a signal analyzer via a DIMM interposer. We configure BIOS
to slightly increase the DRAM supply voltage to offset the
voltage drop caused by the interposer. The bus frequency is
set to 1066 MHz, so the bandwidth of the analyzer is 3.97
GiB/s. With a 64 GiB acquisition depth, we can log the mem-
ory bus for up to ∼ 16 seconds. All of our experiments have
finished in a few seconds, and thus the acquisition depth is
sufficient for logging all the memory requests. To achieve
a wider time window, the attacker can choose an analyzer
which can filter the requests by addresses [57], or which has
a higher acquisition depth [55].
Victim Setup. The victim machine is running Ubuntu 16.04
and Linux kernel 4.4. To execute the victim applications in-
side enclaves, we use Graphene-SGX [54] to run unmodified
binaries with SGX. The victim may also choose other frame-
works [66] or port the applications with the SDK [67], but the
choices of the frameworks do not eliminate the patterns since
they do not change the program logic of the victim.
Sample Size. We collaborate with SK Hynix to use its propri-
etary analyzer for the experiments. Due to the limited access
to the device, we run the attack only once for each setting.
However, we were able to successfully perform the attack
despite the small sample size because the results match well
with our expectations learned from the simulation.
7.1.2 Microarchitectural Simulation
We also implemented a software simulator to simulate the
attack prior to an actual attack because the hardware setup
requires costly devices. We use the simulator for exploring
the attack and getting preliminary results. The results are
then cross-validated with the results from the actual hardware
setup, to verify the functional correctness of the simulation.
The attacker can also use the same strategy to save the ex-
penses for renting the devices. We modify QEMU [38], a
machine emulator, to trace all the physical memory accesses
of the guest. To capture cache misses, we make QEMU emits
all the memory requests to a cache simulator we integrated
from Spike [68]. The cache simulation does not implement
any cycle-accurate hardware model as well as cache slicing
and pseudo-LRU replacement. However, the simulation was
sufficiently faithful for developing the attack scripts to analyze
the real memory traces.
7.1.3 Enclave Simulation
We also simulate an enclave environment without memory
encryption, using a modified Graphene-SGX library OS and a
dummy SGX driver. We consider simulating Intel’s Memory
Encryption Engine (MEE) unnecessary because MEE does
not affect the memory addresses accessed within the EPC.
MEE generates additional access patterns for the integrity tree
or EPC metadata, both of which are stored in the Processor
Reserved Memory outside the EPC. Our attack does not rely
on any access pattern outside the EPC.
The modified Graphene-SGX library OS and the dummy
SGX driver primarily simulate the transition in and out of the
enclave and the paging of enclave memory, to generate similar
memory access patterns as observed on the memory bus. For
simulating enclave entry and exit, we modify the user-tier
SGX instructions, EENTER and EEXIT, in the Graphene-SGX
runtime, to directly jump to addresses that are originally given
as the enclave entry. We also simulate the AEX.
Technique Attack Accuracy Normalized Exec. Time
None 34.1% 1.00×
SQ 82.1% 0.92×
Table 3: MEMBUSTER results for attacking Memcached on
an SGX machine
For simulating EPC paging, we modified the SGX driver to
replace the system-tier SGX instructions, including the ELDU
and EWB instructions, which swap and re-encrypt pages in and
out of the EPC. We simply replace these two instructions
with memory copy without encryption. We compare the mem-
ory traces from the real enclaves and from the simulation to
confirm that the results are identical.
7.1.4 Applications: Hunspell
We run Hunspell v1.6.2 to evaluate the effectiveness of the
MEMBUSTER attack. We use a standard en_US dictionary [69]
with two document samples: a random non-repetitive docu-
ment with 10,000 words (Random), and a natural-language
document “Wizard of Oz” with 39,342 words (Wizard). For
simplicity, we normalize the samples based on en_US dictio-
nary, by converting non-existing words in the samples to the
closet words in the dictionary. MEMBUSTER does not recover
words that are reported as misspelt by Hunspell. In addition,
we disabled affix detection in Hunspell.
We use the pattern matching algorithm described in §6 to
recover the target document from the DRAM traces collected
from the Hunspell program running inside the enclave. We
also enable the hardware prefetching by configuring the BIOS.
To verify the result, we select an interpretation of the DRAM
traces that is closet to the target document, from a set of
highest-ranking results generated from our algorithm.
7.1.5 Application: Memcached
We run Memcached v1.5.12 as another target of the MEM-
BUSTER attack. In this attack, the “secrets” are the data being
looked up in the Memcached cache. We used the Enron email
dataset [70] as a realistic workload for Memcached. First, we
compute the 4-byte hash of each word that appears in emails
in the “sent mail” directory of each user. In total, there are
about 7000 unique word entries in the dataset, which include
articles and propositions. During the training phase, assuming
the attacker is monitoring a Memcached server, the attacker
can determine both the hash table address and the hash value
of each word using the traces of a few queries. Then, during
the attack phase, the attacker monitors the memory bus traffic
of an enclave-protected Memcached server receiving caching
requests from an trusted email server. The email server parses
emails from a test data set that contains randomly selected
emails with around 1000 words in total. As the Memcached
server processes the caching requests from the email server,
the attacker can extract the words in the emails using the
MEMBUSTER attack.
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Figure 9: Hunspell document recovery rate (left) and nor-
malized execution time (right) on two documents: Random
document (Random) and Wizard of Oz (Wizard). The compar-
ison is between without any techniques (None); with cache
squeezing (SQ); and with cache squeezing and cross-core
priming (SQ+PR). For Wizard of Oz, we also show the recov-
ery rate of uncommon words only (w/o NLTK).
7.2 Effectiveness of the Attack
7.2.1 Data Recovery Accuracy
Figure 9 (left) and Table 3 show the accuracy of MEMBUSTER
for recovering the victim’s data. We measure the accuracy
based on the number of words recovered from the collected
traces, compared to the number of words in the original sam-
ples. The recovery rate is higher in a non-repetitive (Random)
or high-interval access pattern (Memcached) than in a repet-
itive access pattern (Wizard). Even without any techniques
(None), Memcached and Random show 34% and 44% recov-
ery rates, respectively. With cache squeezing, we recover 96%
of the random document and 82% of the Memcached query.
However, for Wizard of Oz, None or SQ can only achieve
up to 21% recovery rate. The main reason is that the doc-
ument contains many repetitive words, including common
words such as “you” and “the” and uncommon words such as
“Oz” and “scarecrow”. The memory accesses for these words
are likely to be cached in the LLC cache without emitting
any DRAM requests. On average, each unique word in Wiz-
ard of Oz repeats 15.5 times. We found that without cache
squeezing and cross-core priming, the attack recovers about
0.3 occurrences of each word on average. Even with cache
squeezing, the attack only recovers about 2.6 occurrences.
Since cache squeezing shrinks the effective cache size for
the critical addresses, cross-core priming becomes more ef-
ficient by only priming the sets of the critical addresses. We
show that combining cache squeezing and cross-core priming
(SQ+PR) achieves 85% recovery accuracy on Wizard of Oz.
Furthermore, the attacker is most likely to need only the
uncommon words to be recovered. To exclude common words,
we use stopwords from the NLTK dataset [71] which includes
179 common words (e.g., "the"). Excluding these words,
MEMBUSTER can recover Wizard of Oz up to 95% (Figure 9
Wizard w/o NLTK).
7.2.2 Overhead and Interference
We show that MEMBUSTER does not incur an orders-of-
magnitude overhead that can be distinguishable by the victim.
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Figure 10: Simulation results of the attack on Hunspell (top)
and Memcached (bottom).
Figure 9 (right) shows the normalized execution time with
different attack techniques with respect to the baseline. In
general, both cache squeezing and cross-core priming have a
low performance impact on the victim program, since these
techniques do not interrupt the victim program. For Hunspell,
cache squeezing causes up to 21% overhead to the victim,
and up to 36% if combined with cross-core priming. The
overheads are mainly caused by the increase of cache misses
inside the victim program.
Table 3 also shows the end-to-end execution time of Mem-
cached for processing the whole test set. Similar to Hunspell,
the basic attack incurs no overhead on Memcached. Interest-
ingly, cache squeezing reduces the execution time by 8% for
Memcached. We observe that, on a physical machine, critical
page whitelisting consistently reduces the average LLC miss
rate (2.9% vs. 3.6%) as well as the page fault rate. Because the
physical pages of Memcached’s hash table are pinned inside
the enclave, and thus never get swapped out from the EPC.
Thereby, within the hash table, there is no expensive paging
and context switching cost that generally plagues enclave
execution.
7.2.3 Scalability on # of Ways
We simulated the attack on our simulation environment to
show the scalability of MEMBUSTER. We fixed the number
of sets s = 2048 that most Intel CPUs choose to have. Since
we did not simulate the LLC slices, we increased the size of
the cache by increasing the number of ways, W . To clarify,
increasing the number of ways does not reflect the actual
behavior of LLC with multiple slices. Even if the LLC has
multiple slices, each cache line will compete with W other
cache lines. Thus, increasing W makes the attack much harder,
by reducing the chance of eviction of critical addresses. Note
that a typical W value is between 4 and 16.
As shown in Figure 10, cache squeezing makes cross-core
SQ+PR
SQ
None
Ra
nd
om
# Useful Traces per Word Recovery (%)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
SQ+PR
SQ
None
W
iza
rd
0 20 40 60 80 100
w/ prefetching w/o prefetching
Figure 11: The number of useful traces per word and the
document recovery rate for each experiment. We compare the
cases with or without the hardware prefetcher.
priming much more effective in general by reducing the ef-
fective cache size. Cache squeezing was more scalable on
Hunspell than Memcached, because Hunspell has a larger
critical address range. With W = 64, MEMBUSTER recovered
up to 83% of the random document in Hunspell and 88% of
the emails in Memcached when both cache squeezing and
cross-core priming have been used. Even assuming an unre-
alistic number of ways W = 256, which results in 32 MB of
LLC, the attack accuracy was 77% and 40% respectively.
7.3 Per-Application Detailed Analysis
7.3.1 Hunspell: Advantage of Cache Prefetching
We also show the advantage of exploiting cache prefetching
for MEMBUSTER. For Hunspell, the attacker recovers each
word based on multiple memory accesses. If the attacker ob-
serves more traces relevant to each word, recovering the word
becomes easier. Hence, if the attacker knows the presence of
cache prefetchers in advance, she can use the information to
correlate the prefetched addresses with each word (§6).
As shown in Figure 11, cache prefetching increases the av-
erage number of useful traces per word. Including prefetched
addresses increases the recovery rate especially when there
are very few useful traces (None and SQ). Although the im-
provement is marginal in our experiment, the attacker can
potentially use the additional memory requests made by the
cache prefetchers to extract more information from the victim.
7.3.2 Memcached: Advantage of Fine-Grained Ad-
dresses
To show the advantage of observing fine-grained addresses,
we simulated the controlled-channel attack on Memcached
example. We first obtained the entire memory trace from
Memcached without simulating the cache. We then masked
the lower 12-bits of all addresses assuming each page is 4 KB.
With this post-processing, we were able to simulate the mem-
ory trace that the controlled-channel attacker will observe.
We also reconstruct the attacker’s hash table such that each
page-granularity address maps to multiple entries in the hash
table. If the attacker sees an address, she simply chooses the
most common word among the possible entries.
The simulated controlled-channel attack achieves only 29%
accuracy, and the recovered document was uninterpretable as
it only contained common words such as “the” and “of”. This
shows that MEMBUSTER leverages fine-grained addresses by
providing more side-channel information than coarse-grained
addresses.
8 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the limitations, generalization, im-
plications, and mitigations of the MEMBUSTER attack.
Limitations. MEMBUSTER leaks only memory access pat-
terns at LLC misses. Thus, MEMBUSTER cannot observe
repeated accesses to the same address within a short period.
For instance, the former RSA implementation of GnuPG [72]
is known to leak a private key through code addresses in the
ElGamal algorithm [45]. This type of attack relies on data-
dependent branches, as the attacker detects different code
paths executed inside the victim to infer the secret. However,
these vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit by MEMBUSTER,
due to these code addresses being frequently executed and
thus cached in the CPU. Even cache priming techniques can-
not efficiently evict the code addresses in time to help the
attacker retrieve the secret with high accuracy but keep the
performance impact low.
In general, MEMBUSTER is more suitable for leaking data-
dependent memory loads over a large heap or array. For in-
stance, both the attacks on Hunspell and Memcached rely on
the access patterns within a large hash table and/or linked-list
objects. If the victim program only has data-dependent mem-
ory access patterns within a small region, or if the memory
access is not evenly distributed, the accuracy of MEMBUSTER
is likely to worsen. Besides, if the application only leaks a
secret through stores that are dependent on the secret, MEM-
BUSTER may not observe the memory requests immediately.
The reason is that the CPU tends to delay write-back of dirty
data until the cache lines are evicted, making the timing of the
memory requests appearing on the memory bus unpredictable.
We leave the exploration of such scenario for future work.
Timing Information. Although not explored in this paper,
an attacker may exploit the timing information to attack the
victim. The DRAM analyzer logs a precise timestamp for
each memory request based on counting its clock cycles. Po-
tentially, an attacker can measure the time difference between
two memory traces, to infer the execution time of operation
in the victim as a way of timing attacks. We leave the demon-
stration of these attacks for future work.
Traffic Analysis. Potentially, the memory bus traffic
recorded by the DRAM analyzer can be used for traffic anal-
ysis if the victim is vulnerable to this type of attacks. For
instance, the attacker may analyze either the density or the
volume of requests on a specific address to infer the activity or
secret of the application. A complete mitigation of the attack
should eliminate the timing information and has a constant
traffic flow on the memory bus [36].
Multiple DIMMs or Multi-Socket. Our current attack
does not explore the possibility of having multiple DIMMs
or multiple CPU sockets (currently not supported by SGX).
However, potentially, the attacker can attach multiple DIMM
interposers, and then correlate the DRAM traces using times-
tamps or common patterns.
Memory Controllers. A memory controller arbitrates all
transactions to main memory such that it maximizes the
throughput while minimizing latencies. One of the key fea-
tures that may make MEMBUSTER more challenging is trans-
action scheduling where the arbiter reorders the transaction
requests to maximize the performance. In other words, the
order of the memory transactions observed by the attacker
may differ from the actual order of memory accesses.
We observe that the arbitration of the memory controller
does not stop an enclave from leaking sensitive access pat-
terns. First, even if transactions are reordered, the critical
addresses will still eventually appear on the memory bus.
Also, the memory controller only reorders transactions within
a very small time window (e.g., tens of bus cycles), which
is not enough to obfuscate the critical memory accesses that
occur at least every hundreds of instructions.
Generalization. Intel SGX is not the only platform affected
by MEMBUSTER. Other existing platforms of hardware en-
claves [4, 5, 40, 41] also do not encrypt the addresses on the
memory bus. Thus, these platforms are also vulnerable to
MEMBUSTER as long as the CPU stores encrypted data in
external memory (e.g., DRAM). The attacker can also use
the same techniques such as cache squeezing to induce cache
misses on other platforms. For example, Komodo [40] allows
the OS to affect the virtual address mapping, which enables
the attacker to use cache squeezing. Keystone [4] measures
the initial virtual address mapping for attestation, thus cache
squeezing cannot be applied. However, it provides cache par-
titioning which can reduce the effective cache size of the
enclave.
Implications and Disclosure. Potentially, MEMBUSTER
can be used in two scenarios: (1) a malicious user attack-
ing an end device to retrieve secret data from a local enclave;
(2) a malicious cloud provider or employee attacking a cloud
machine to retrieve secret data from the tenants. The existence
of MEMBUSTER shows the importance of physical security to
enclaves just on par with software security. Ideally, in a secure
cloud, one may want to separate the person who has physical
access to the machine from the person who has administrative
privileges. This may be achieved by a secure boot system that
prevents people who have physical access from overwriting
system privileges.
We have disclosed the details of this attack to Intel, who
has acknowledged its validity.
Mitigations. There are several ways to mitigate MEM-
BUSTER, but they are generally expensive. Oblivious RAM
(ORAM) [34, 73] can make the applications execute in an
oblivious manner so that the attacker cannot infer secret
data based on the memory access pattern. The high perfor-
mance overhead of ORAM makes it less attractive for appli-
cations that have strong performance requirements. Alterna-
tively, we can also encrypt the address bus as proposed by
InvisiMem [36] and ObfusMem [37]. However, adding such
a feature to commodity DRAM would be very expensive;
take the cost of techniques such as Hybrid Memory Cube
(HMC) [74] for an example. In-package memory such as high
bandwidth memory (HBM) may relieve the needs for protec-
tion against untrusted DRAM [75], but remains an expensive
alternative for production.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced MEMBUSTER, which is a non-
interference, fine-grained, stealthy physical side-channel at-
tack on hardware enclaves based on snooping the address
lines of the memory bus off-chip. The key idea is to exploit
OS privileges to induce cache misses with minimal perfor-
mance overhead. We also demystify the physical bus-based
side channel by reverse-engineering the internals of several
hardware components. We then develop an algorithm that
can retrieve application secrets from memory bus traces. We
demonstrated the attack on an actual SGX machine; the attack
achieved similar accuracy with much lower overhead than pre-
vious attacks such as controlled-channel attacks. We believe
the attack technique is prevalent beyond Intel SGX and can
apply to other secure processors or enclave platforms, which
do not protect memory buses.
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